金融英语保险与证卷业务相关辅导14
The epoch of Customary Law， and of its custody by a privileged order， is a very remarkable one. The condition of the jurisprudence which it implies has left traces which may still be detected in legal and popular phraseology. The law， thus known exclusively to a privileged minority， whether a caste， an aristocracy， a priestly tribe， or a sacerdotal college， is true unwritten law. Except this， there is no such thing as unwritten law in the world. English case-law is sometimes spoken of as unwritten， and there are some English theorists who assure us that if a code of English jurisprudence were prepared we should be turning unwritten law into written —— conversion， as they insist， if not of doubtful policy， at all events of the greatest seriousness. Now， it is quite true that there was once a period at which the English common law might reasonably have been termed unwritten. The elder English judges did really pretend to knowledge of rules， principles， and distinctions which were not entirely revealed to the bar and to the lay-public. Whether all the law which they claimed to monopolise was really unwritten， is exceedingly questionable； but at all events， on the assumption that there was once a large mass of civil and criminal rules known exclusively to the judges， it presently ceased to be unwritten law. As soon as the Courts at Westminster Hall began to base their judgments on cases recorded， whether in the year books or elsewhere， the law which they administered became written law. At the present moment a rule of English law has first to be disentangled from the recorded facts of adjudged printed precedents， then thrown into a form of words varying with the taste， precision， and knowledge of the particular judge， and then applied to the circumstances of the case for adjudication. But at no stage of this process has it any characteristic which distinguishes it from written law. It is written case-law， and only different from code-law because it is written in a different way.From the period of Customary Law we come to another sharply defined epoch in the history of jurisprudence. We arrive at the era of Codes， those ancient codes of which the Twelve Tables of Rome were the most famous specimen. In Greece， in Italy， on the Hellenised sea-board of Western Asia， these codes all made their appearance at periods much the same everywhere， not， I mean， at periods identical in point of time， but similar in point of the relative progress of each community. Everywhere， in the countries I have named， laws engraven on tablets and published to the people take the place of usages deposited with the recollection of a privileged oligarchy. It must not for a moment be supposed that the refined considerations now urged in favour of what is called codification had any part or place in the change I have described. The ancient codes were doubtless originally suggested by the discovery and diffusion of the art of writing. It is true that the aristocracies seem to have abused their monopoly of legal knowledge； and at all events their exclusive possession of the law was a formidable impediment to the success of those popular movements which began to be universal in the western world. But， though democratic sentiment may have added to their popularity， the codes were certainly in the main a direct result of the invention of writing. Inscribed tablets were seen to be a better depositary of law， and a better security for its accurate preservation， than the memory of a number of persons however strengthened by habitual exercise.
The Roman code belongs to the class of codes I have been describing. Their value did not consist in any approach to symmetrical classifications， or to terseness and clearness of expression， but in their publicity， and in the knowledge which they furnished to everybody， as to what he was to do， and what not to do. It is， indeed， true that the Twelve Tables of Rome do exhibit some traces of systematic arrangement， but this is probably explained by the tradition that the framers of that body of law called in the assistance of Greeks who enjoyed the later Greek experience in the art of law-making. The fragments of the Attic Code of Solon show， however， that it had but little order， and probably the laws of Draco had even less. Quite enough too remains of these collections， both in the East and in the West， to show that they mingled up religious， civil， and merely moral ordinances， without any regard to differences in their essential character and this is consistent with all we know of early thought from other sources， the severance of law from morality， and of religion from law， belonging very distinctly to the later stages of mental progress.
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