46. Contrary to the statement's premise, my view is that businesses are less likely
& m2 F4 e( D( ~than government to establish large bureaucracies, because businesses know that they are
; ^" \6 E+ w4 Z6 Z" A: m Dmore vulnerable than government to damage resulting from bureaucratic inefficiencies. ( N2 m! _1 P3 o7 Y, f' x
My position is well supported by common sense and by observation.
0 w( p0 t% w. L6 u First, public istrators lack the financial incentives to avoid bureaucratic ' m: E1 n7 O9 O5 v- G2 E: \
waste. In contrast, inefficiencies in a private corporation will reduce profits, inflicting 5 w8 b( _& {# U h' x6 l: T
damage in the form of job cuts, diminishing common-stock value, and reducing 1 p( E, v& J, ^! M- g
employee compensation. These are ample incentives for the private firm to minimize 0 |0 |# I+ b! _2 n+ K4 O2 \
bureaucratic waste.
% h' n9 l2 `3 Z2 B. K Second, there is almost no accountability among government bureaucrats. The
; V8 k$ e' _* W1 M* J4 \ {, c: ielectorate's voting power is too indirect to motivate mid-level istrators, whose " G/ C" W; s& Q3 _: Y$ X; k% H
salaries and jobs rarely depend on political elections. In contrast, private corporations
% S- R. A7 M2 {5 F: M1 o& mmust pay strict attention to efficiency, since their shareholders hold an immediate power
1 s5 c0 O$ r9 Nto sell their stock, thereby driving down the company's market value.
0 J/ [" |, z1 N Third, government is inherently monopolistic, large, and unwieldy; these features
; P5 [) O. _, s& H1 k0 wbreed bureaucracy. Admittedly some corporations rival state governments in size. Yet 1 z( S) V: {+ u! f
even among the largest companies, the profit motive breeds a natural concern for 1 a: b& Q% y& [* Y- y( g
trimming waste, cutting costs, and streamlining operations. Even virtual monopolies
1 K( u7 @( B9 j' i1 D7 l `. L$ nstrive to remain lean and nimble in order to maintain a distance from upstart
- M* k! g! O- @+ icompetitors. When government pays lip service to efficiency, shrewd listeners recognize 0 H: t" w& o% ~# n
this as political rhetoric designed only to pander to the electorate.6 S8 Y6 B( z8 k) ?0 g
In the final analysis, financial incentives, accountability, and competition all
B4 I, `: o1 W D* ldistinguish private business from government, both in teems of their likelihood of 4 z$ ~: M9 @- y; i0 ]( q
establishing large bureaucracies and in terms of the damage that these bureaucracies can
9 W( M, H* @/ }) p& z6 Zinflict on the organization. |