Four legal approaches may be followed in at-
, n* @# e1 E6 ^# g; Dtempting to channel technological development
' X8 {& W. j0 A* yin socially useful directions: specific directives,
) n0 h" n1 V1 S) T- ymarket incentive modifications, criminal prohi-
9 D4 i( H, w/ U: ] (5) bitions, and changes in decision-making struc- 1 O( ?! T" |4 _% w% X
tures. Specific directives involve the govern- ( e2 F+ S3 K$ }+ ]; q
ment’s identifying one or more factors control- ' }/ d6 V" j$ e
ling research, development, or implementation ) }' Y+ F# w+ E# Q+ F7 n
of a given technology. Directives affecting such
; h4 s/ W3 E3 [- ?- H(10) factors may vary from administrative regulation 4 F1 Q$ c" \, {/ r! u
of private activity to government ownership of a / N4 x$ p; Y# U1 F
technological operation. Market incentive modi- + O& H7 k1 d& {& H2 y9 I/ B
fications are deliberate alterations of the market $ _9 b9 r7 G" k2 k1 ~3 `
within which private decisions regarding the , }5 X5 o7 U' O6 P
(15)development and implementation of technology , @ I H" @1 l* Q
are made. Such modifications may consist of
1 D5 ~, V( s T8 Zimposing taxes to cover the costs to society of a 0 V: z2 e% T9 b5 b9 w
given technology, granting subsidies to pay for $ Z. G2 V3 C4 w! q+ s/ M
social benefits of a technology, creating the right 0 S" G2 @& Q ~! @# |. J+ D
(20) to sue to prevent certain technological develop- $ Z p, `7 u0 P& c" j/ }: l6 t
ment, or easing procedural rules to enable the
- e* q1 N4 q7 U/ k% n: Rrecovery of damages to compensate for harm 9 i7 J& n d, H' e0 \
caused by destructive technological activity.
4 q, h6 k1 s% c, c8 G- vCriminal prohibitions may modify technological / l: Z8 `* m; t3 B6 n
(25) activity in areas impinging on fundament soc-
8 c5 U5 d" ^5 N* q# I4 |4 nial values, or they may modify human behavior ) M B M! `* P1 Y' n1 Z) x1 v
likely to result from technological applications—
) h8 J/ p0 L9 _for example, the deactivation of automotive " G, D9 e9 ?" n, V f" ]/ L
pollution control devices in order to improve
6 T2 a; g1 k: i I8 m; E: L(30) vehicle performance. Alteration of decision-
+ Y2 D/ X7 p" H c. b% j& ]making structures includes all possible modifica- 1 n# |" U% K+ Z2 K$ [0 z
tions in the authority, constitution, or responsi-
0 \" m$ h# z# D' R, ^5 K5 k9 i2 gbility of private and public entities deciding
8 F" g5 L! K7 `" Z3 yquestions of technological development and 8 }! A6 S7 y- v: q) N/ u
(35) implementation. Such alterations include the 2 U* F9 _$ v" {+ v; x: v) Z
addition of public-interest members to corporate
. V# W' D$ r2 a% w; P6 g, Bboards, the imposition by statute of duties on 0 Y6 @& q; p# u, N& `
governmental decision-makers, and the exten- 2 X; Q9 R' u' p4 _4 U) n' O* I7 o
sion of warranties in response to consumer
! g( N4 A3 ?0 \) ` Y) A, h(40) action. / V1 y, `+ ~: k! r% A
Effective use of these methods to control
" a0 J2 u+ U1 t3 L, p7 ?0 R) n5 wtechnology depends on whether or not the goal 6 l/ h7 e+ M5 T* `+ R- H
of regulation is the optimal allocation of
" C) ~3 h3 o- [6 J4 n2 B' l8 r( Kresources. When the object is optimal resource
5 b$ O1 Q0 d( Y2 K7 s9 \! x(45) allocation, that combination of legal methods ! n& L" x' X+ D$ W% c' Z& N
should be used that most nearly yields the allo- 3 N2 @' A8 B8 H' \$ L }+ j
cation that would exist if there were no external 3 g1 @9 N) F3 O! N$ G" }% w
costs resulting from allocating resources through 7 o% T8 R4 u2 i% M
market activity. There are external costs, when 3 h) _4 X- G, i% o" e, P
(50) the price set by buyers and sellers of goods fails |