美国独立战争对于北美殖民地反对英国暴政、追求独立自主的正义事业意义深远。但是,如同其他战争一样,所付出的代价是沉重的。除了人员伤亡造成的巨大损失,军需供应扰乱了殖民地的经济秩序。此外,英国的贸易封锁造成物资匮乏,国内财政赤字引发恶性通货膨胀。尽管生活困窘,殖民地人群情激昂,又战斗又生产,带动了美国制造业的兴旺。
( M. S6 A m( b6 I0 ?% l# q The Revolutionary War(1), which began officially on April 19, 1775, dragged on for more than six bitter years. It was a conflict fought by the colonials for the righteous cause of securing freedom from intolerable British intervention in American affairs(2).: [+ Y1 V/ F9 S* @% X9 }! c! V
Maritime commerce was always an important factor in the war effort, and trade linkages were vital to the supply of arms and ammunitions. When legal restrictions(3) were implemented by both the British and the colonists in 1775, nearly all American overseas commerce abruptly ceased. By mid-1775, the colonies faced acute shor tages in such military essentials as powder, flints, muskets, and knives. Even salt, shoes, woolens, and linens were in short supply. Late in 1775, Congress(4) auth orized limited trade with the West Indies, mainly to procure arms and ammunitions , and trade with other non-British areas was on an unrestricted basis by the spring of 1776., W& i' w4 l6 Z% K1 @' D1 j7 Z2 z
Nevertheless, the British maintained a fairly effective naval blockade of Americ an ports, especially during the first two years of the war. Yet the colonies engaged in international trade despite the blockade. Formal treaties of commerce with France in 1778 and with Holland and Spain shortly thereafter stimulated the flows of overseas trade.(5) Between 1778 and early 1782, American wartime commerce was at its zenith. During those years, France, Holland, Spain, and their possessions all actively traded with the colonies. Even so, the flow of goods in and out of the colonies remained well below prewar levels. Smuggling, privateering, and legal trade with overseas partners only partially offset the drastic trade reductions with Britain. Even the coastal trades were curtailed by a lack of vessels, by blockades, and by wartime freight rates. British-occupied ports, such as New York, generated some import activity but little or nothing in the way of exports.
8 u& B7 | i4 i( E w As exports and imports fell, import substitution(6) abounded, and the colonial economy became considerably more self-sufficient. In Philadelphia, for instance, nearly 4,000 women were employed to spin materials in their homes for the newly esta blished textile plants. A sharp increase also occurred in the number of artisan workshops with a similar stimulus in the production of beer, whiskey, and other do mestic alcoholic beverages. The rechanneling of American resources into import-competing industries was especially strong along the coast and in the major port cities. Only the least-commercialized rural areas remained little affected by the serpentine path of war and the sporadic flows of wartime commerce.3 a. ]6 R6 j2 S' C0 o4 K' ]5 P, O* C5 e: m
Overall, the war imposed a distinct economic hardship on the new nation. Most go ods rose in cost and were more difficult to obtain. High prices and severe commercial difficulties encouraged some investors to turn from commerce to manufacturing. Then, once the trade lanes reopened with the coming of peace, even those who profited from the war were stung by the tide of imports that swept into American ports and sharply lowered prices. Although many Americans escaped the direct ordea ls of war, few Americans were untouched by it --- at least indirectly.
4 p0 D8 h; _$ Q) I6 k! q' a$ ~ Internally, the most pressing problems were financial. Between 1775 and 1781, the war was financed by the issue of paper money in amounts great enough to result in a galloping inflation(7) --- the only one ever experienced in America except in the Confederate South. Nearly $400 million (at face value) in continental money, quartermaster and commissary certificates of the central government, and paper money of the states was issued to defray wartime expenses. For all practical purposes, these various issues were repudiated by the middle of 1783, the effect being at ax(8) on those who held the depreciating currency while it declined in value(9). Only a relatively small foreign and domestic debttotaling less than $40 million remained(10), but the question of responsibility for its repayment remained a thorny issue because political leaders assumed that the states that paid the debt would ultimately hold the balance of power politically. More important was the fact that Congress had no independent income and had to rely for funds on catch-as-catch-can(11) contributions from the states, made roughly in proportion to their individual populations. Nor were the states without their own fiscal problems. By 1786, no less than seven states were issuing their own paper, and debtor groups(12) in the other six states were clamoring for similar issues. Although the issuing states (except Rhode Island) acted responsibly, perhaps no other course of events so frigh tened conservatives(13) as the control of the money supply by the states. Indeed, the legacy of hyperinflation left a general distrust of government monetary manage ment. |