金融英语保险与证卷业务相关辅导20

会计考友

　　It is remarkable that this system did not produce certain effects which might on the whole have been expected from it. It did not， for example， popularise the Roman law —— it did not， as in some of the Greek republics， lessen the effort of intellect required for the mastery of the science， although its diffusion and authoritative exposition were opposed by no artificial barriers. On the contrary， if it had not been for the operation of a separate set of causes， there were strong probabilities that the Roman jurisprudence would have become as minute， technical， and difficult as any system which has since prevailed. Again， a consequence which might still more naturally have been looked for， does not appear at any time to have exhibited itself. The jurisconsults， until the liberties of Rome were overthrown， formed a class which was quite undefined and must have fluctuated greatly in numbers； nevertheless， there does not seem to have existed a doubt as to the particular individuals whose opinion， in their generation， was conclusive on the cases submitted to them. The vivid pictures of a leading jurisconsult's daily practice which abound in Latin literature —— the clients from the country flocking to his antechamber in the early morning， and the students standing round with their note-books to record the great lawyer's replies —— are seldom or never identified at any given period with more than one or two conspicuous names. Owing too to the direct contact of the client and the advocate， the Roman people itself seems to have been always alive to the rise and fall of professional reputation， and there is abundance of proof， more particularly in the well-known oration of Cicero， Pro Muraena， that the reverence of the commons for forensic success was apt to be excessive rather than deficient.
　　We cannot doubt that the peculiarities which have been noted in the instrumentality by which the development of the Roman law was first effected， were the source of its characteristic excellence， its early wealth in principles. The growth and exuberance of principle was fostered， in part， by the competition among the expositors of the law， an influence wholly unknown where there exists a Bench， the depositaries intrusted by king or commonwealth with the prerogative of justice. But the chief agency， no doubt， was the uncontrolled multiplication of cases for legal decision. The state of facts which caused genuine perplexity to a country client was not a whit more entitled to form the basis of the jurisconsult's Response， or legal decision， than a set of hypothetical circumstances propounded by an ingenious pupil. All combinations of fact were on precisely the same footing， whether they were real or imaginary. It was nothing to the jurisconsult that his opinion was overruled for the moment by the magistrate who adjudicated on his client's case， unless that magistrate happened to rank above him in legal knowledge or the esteem of his profession. I do not， indeed， mean it to be inferred that he would wholly omit to consider his client's advantage， for the client was in earlier times the great lawyer's constituent and at a later period his paymaster， but the main road to the rewards of ambition lay through the good opinion of his order， and it is obvious that under such a system as I have been describing this was much more likely to be secured by viewing each case as an illustration of a great principle， or an exemplification of a broad rule， than by merely shaping it for an insulated forensic triumph. A still more powerful influence must have been exercised by the want of any distinct check on the suggestion or invention of possible questions. Where the data can be multiplied at pleasure， the facilities for evolving a general rule are immensely increased. As the law is administered among ourselves， the judge cannot travel out of the sets of facts exhibited before him or before his predecessors. Accordingly each group of circumstances which is adjudicated upon receives， to employ a Gallicism， a sort of consecration. It acquires certain qualities which distinguish it from every other case genuine or hypothetical. But at Rome， as I have attempted to explain， there was nothing resembling a Bench or Chamber of judges； and therefore no combination of facts possessed any particular value more than another. When a difficulty came for opinion before the jurisconsult， there was nothing to prevent a person endowed with a nice perception of analogy from at once proceeding to adduce and consider an entire class of supposed questions with which a particular feature connected it. Whatever were the practical advice given to the client， the responsum treasured up in the notebooks of listening pupils would doubtless contemplate the circumstances as governed by a great principle， or included in a sweeping rule. Nothing like this has ever been possible among ourselves， and it should be acknowledged that in many criticisms passed on the English law the manner in which it has been enunciated seems to have been lost sight of. The hesitation of our courts in declaring principles may be much more reasonably attributed to the comparative scantiness of our precedents， voluminous as they appear to him who is acquainted with no other system， than to the temper of our judges. It is true that in the wealth of legal principle we are considerably poorer than several modern European nations. But they， it must be remembered， took the Roman jurisprudence for the foundation of their civil institutions. They built the debris of the Roman law into their walls； but in the materials and workmanship of the residue there is not much which distinguishes it favourably from the structure erected by the English judicature.