金融英语保险与证卷业务相关辅导19

会计考友

　　A body of law bearing a very close and very instructive resemblance to our case-law in those particulars which I have noticed， was known to the Romans under the name of the Responsa Prudentum， the "answers of the learned in the law." The form of these Responses varied a good deal at different periods of the Roman jurisprudence， but throughout its whole course they consisted of explanatory glosses on authoritative written documents， and at first they were exclusively collections of opinions interpretative of the Twelve Tables. As with us， all legal language adjusted itself to the assumption that the text of the old Code remained unchanged. There was the express rule. It overrode all glosses and comments， and no one openly admitted that any interpretation of it， however eminent the interpreter， was safe from revision on appeal to the venerable texts. Yet in point of fact， Books of Responses bearing the names of leading jurisconsults obtained an authority at least equal to that of our reported cases， and constantly modified， extended， limited or practically overruled the provisions of the Decemviral law. The authors of the new jurisprudence during the whole progress of its formation professed the most sedulous respect for the letter of the Code. They were merely explaining it， deciphering it， bringing out its full meaning； but then， in the result， by piecing texts together， by adjusting the law to states of fact which actually presented themselves and by speculating on its possible application to others which might occur， by introducing principles of interpretation derived from the exegesis of other written documents which fell under their observation， they educed a vast variety of canons which had never been dreamed of by the compilers of the Twelve Tables and which were in truth rarely or never to be found there. All these treatises of the jurisconsults claimed respect on the ground of their assumed conformity with the Code， but their comparative authority depended on the reputation of the particular jurisconsults who gave them to the world. Any name of universally acknowledged greatness clothed a Book of responses with a binding force hardly less than that which belonged to enactments of the legislature； and such a book in its turn constituted a new foundation on which a further body of jurisprudence might rest. The responses of the early lawyers were not however published， in the modern sense， by their author. They were recorded and edited by his pupils， and were not therefore in all probability arranged according to any scheme of classification. The part of the students in these publications must be carefully noted， because the service they rendered to their teacher seems to have been generally repaid by his sedulous attention to the pupils' education. The educational treatises called Institutes or Commentaries， which are a later fruit of the duty then recognised， are among the most remarkable features of the Roman system. It was apparently in these Institutional works， and not in the books intended for trained lawyers， that the jurisconsults gave to the public their classifications and their proposals for modifying and improving the technical phraseology.
　　In comparing the Roman Responsa Prudentum with their nearest English counterpart， it must be carefully borne in mind that the authority by which this part of the Roman jurisprudence was expounded was not the bench， but the bar. The decision of a Roman tribunal， though conclusive in the particular case， had no ulterior authority except such as was given by the professional repute of the magistrate who happened to be in office for the time. Properly speaking， there was no institution at Rome during the republic analogous to the English Bench， the Chambers of imperial Germany， or the Parliaments of Monarchical France. There were magistrates indeed， invested with momentous judicial functions in their several departments， but the tenure of the magistracies was but for a single year， so that they are much less aptly compared to a permanent judicature than to a cycle of offices briskly circulating among the leaders of the bar. Much might be said on the origin of a condition of things which looks to us like a startling anomaly， but which was in fact much more congenial than our own system to the spirit of ancient societies， tending， as they always did， to split into distinct orders which， however exclusive themselves， tolerated no professional hierarchy above them.