金融英语保险与证卷业务相关辅导17

会计考友

　　I confine myself in what follows to the progressive societies. With respect to them it may be laid down that social necessities and social opinion are always more or less in advance of Law. We may come indefinitely near to the closing of the gap between them， but it has a perpetual tendency to reopen. Law is stable； the societies we are speaking of are progressive. The greater or less happiness of a people depends on the degree of promptitude with which the gulf is narrowed.
　　A general proposition of some value may be advanced with respect to the agencies by which Law is brought into harmony with society These instrumentalities seem to me to be three in number， Legal Fictions， Equity， and Legislation. Their historical order is that in which I have placed them. Sometimes two of them will be seen operating together， and there are legal systems which have escaped the influence of one or other of them. But I know of no instance in which the order of their appearance has been changed or inverted. The early history of one of them， Equity， is universally obscure， and hence it may be thought by some that certain isolated statutes， reformatory of the civil law， are older than any equitable jurisdiction. My own belief is that remedial Equity is everywhere older than remedial Legislation； but， should this be not strictly true， it would only be necessary to limit the proposition respecting their order of sequence to the periods at which they exercise a sustained and substantial influence in trans forming the original law.
　　I employ the word "fiction" in a sense considerably wider than that in which English lawyer are accustomed to use it， and with a meaning much more extensive than that which belonged to the Roman "fictiones." Fictio， in old Roman law， is properly a term of pleading， and signifies a false averment on the part of the plaintiff which the defendant was not allowed to traverse； such， for example， as an averment that the plaintiff was a Roman citizen， when in truth he was a foreigner. The object of these "fictiones" was， of course， to give jurisdiction， and they therefore strongly resembled the allegations in the writs of the English Queen's Bench， and Exchequer， by which those Courts contrived to usurp the jurisdiction of the Common Pleas： —— the allegation that the defendant was in custody of the king's marshal， or that the plaintiff was the king's debtor， and could not pay his debt by reason of the defendant's default. But I now employ the expression "Legal Fiction" to signify any assumption which conceals， or affects to conceal， the fact that a rule of law has undergone alteration， its letter remaining unchanged， its operation being modified. The words， therefore， include the instances of fictions which I have cited from the English and Roman law， but they embrace much more， for I should speak both of the English Case-law and of the Roman Responsa Prudentum as resting on fictions. Both these examples will be examined presently. The fact is in both cases that the law has been wholly changed； the fiction is that it remains what it always was. It is not difficult to understand why fictions in all their forms are particularly congenial to the infancy of society. They satisfy the desire for improvement， which is not quite wanting， at the same time that they do not offend the superstitious disrelish for change which is always present. At a particular stage of social progress they are invaluable expedients for overcoming the rigidity of law， and， indeed， without one of them， the Fiction of Adoption which permits the family tie to be artificially created， it is difficult to understand how society would ever have escaped from its swaddling clothes， and taken its first steps towards civilisation. We must， therefore， not suffer ourselves to be affected by the ridicule which Bentham pours on legal fictions wherever he meets them. To revile them as merely fraudulent is to betray ignorance of their peculiar office in the historical development of law. But at the same time it would be equally foolish to agree with those theorists， who， discerning that fictions have had their uses， argue that they ought to be stereotyped in our system. They have had their day， but it has long since gone by. It is unworthy of us to effect an admittedly beneficial object by so rude a device as a legal fiction. I cannot admit any anomaly to be innocent， which makes the law either more difficult to understand or harder to arrange in harmonious order. Now legal fictions are the greatest of obstacles to symmetrical classification. The rule of law remains sticking in the system， but it is a mere shell. It has been long ago undermined， and a new rule hides itself under its cover. Hence there is at once a difficulty in knowing whether the rule which is actually operative should be classed in its true or in its apparent place， and minds of different casts will differ as to the branch of the alternative which ought to be selected. If the English law is ever to assume an orderly distribution， it will be necessary to prune away the legal fictions which， in spite of some recent legislative improvements， are still abundant in it.