金融英语保险与证卷业务相关辅导16

会计考友

　　Chapter 2. Legal Fictions
　　When primitive law has once been embodied in a Code， there is an end to what may be called its spontaneous development. Henceforward the changes effected in it， if effected at all， are effected deliberately and from without. It is impossible to suppose that the customs of any race or tribe remained unaltered during the whole of the long —— in some instances the immense —— interval between their declaration by a patriarchal monarch and their publication in writing. It would be unsafe too to affirm that no part of the alteration was effected deliberately. But from the little we know of the progress of law during this period， we are justified in assuming that set purpose had the very smallest share in producing change. Such innovations on the earliest usages as disclose themselves appear to have been dictated by feelings and modes of thought which， under our present mental conditions， we are unable to comprehend. A new era begins， however， with the Codes. Wherever， after this epoch， we trace the course of legal modification we are able to attribute it to the conscious desire of improvement， or at all events of compassing objects other than those which were aimed at in the primitive times.
　　It may seem at first sight that no general propositions worth trusting can be elicited from the history of legal systems subsequent to the codes. The field is too vast. We cannot be sure that we have included a sufficient number of phenomena in our observations， or that we accurately understand those which we have observed. But the undertaking will be seen to be more feasible， if we consider that after the epoch of codes the distinction between stationary and progressive societies begins to make itself felt. It is only with the progressive that we are concerned， and nothing is more remarkable than their extreme fewness. In spite of overwhelming evidence， it is most difficult for a citizen of western Europe to bring thoroughly home to himself the truth that the civilisation which surrounds him is a rare exception in the history of the world. The tone of thought common among us， all our hopes， fears， and speculations， would be materially affected， if we had vividly before us the relation of the progressive races to the totality of human life. It is indisputable that much the greatest part of mankind has never shown a particle of desire that its civil institutions should be improved since the moment when external completeness was first given to them by their embodiment in some permanent record. One set of usages has occasionally been violently overthrown and superseded by another； here and there a primitive code， pretending to a supernatural origin， has been greatly extended， and distorted into the most surprising forms， by the perversity of sacerdotal commentators； but， except in a small section of the world， there has been nothing like the gradual amelioration of a legal system. There has been material civilisation， but， instead of the civilisation expanding the law， the law has limited the civilisation. The study of races in their primitive condition affords us some clue to the point at which the development of certain societies has stopped. We can see that Brahminical India has not passed beyond a stage which occurs in the history of all the families of mankind， the stage at which a rule of law is not yet discriminated from a rule of religion. The members of such a society consider that the transgression of a religious ordinance should be punished by civil penalties， and that the violation of a civil duty exposes the delinquent to divine correction. In China this point has been passed， but progress seems to have been there arrested， because the civil laws are coextensive with all the ideas of which the race is capable. The difference between the stationary and progressive societies is， however， one of the great secrets which inquiry has yet to penetrate. Among partial explanations of it I venture to place the considerations urged at the end of the last chapter. It may further be remarked that no one is likely to succeed in the investigation who does not clearly realise that the stationary condition of the human race is the rule， the progressive the exception. And another indispensable condition of success is an accurate knowledge of Roman law in all its principal stages. The Roman jurisprudence has the longest known history of any set of human institutions. The character of all the changes which it underwent is tolerably well ascertained. From its commencement to its close， it was progressively modified for the better， or for what the author of the modification conceived to be the better， and the course of improvement was continued through periods at which all the rest of human thought and action materially slackened its pace， and repeatedly threatened to settle down into stagnation.