n If a teacher says, “I have run out of chalk” in the process of lecturing, the act of saying is locutionary, the act of demanding for chalk is illocutionary, and the effect the utterance brings about – one of the students will go and get some chalk – is perlocutionary.3 R& v* Z7 N$ t( e' H6 x& U
n In English, illocutionary acts are also given specific labels, such as request, warning, promise, invitation, compliment, complaint, apology, offer, refusal, etc. these specific labels name various speech functions.9 D. A% `, X3 |$ |/ i v. S
n As functions may not correspond to forms, speech acts can be direct and indirect.
) S! u- c: `2 g+ g) @) Y4 r' j u Searle: two ways of communication (performing acts)
7 f7 s% g% A; i" F( M8 d- R- E l Direct speech act: Close the door.* \/ O1 ?6 _2 e
l Indirect speech act: It’s cold in here.0 M5 e4 j, q; C6 ^+ K, G
u Why do people often speak indirectly in social communication?
o& B9 _, @' X/ b l Different social variables: age, sex, social condition8 r( c- q7 {$ S$ Q) U' l4 C) p5 d
l Politeness: communicative strategy
. c, u: S' [" \/ K# L/ [2 U! o) w% i u Indirect speech acts are related to appropriateness.
; C/ a& T3 U4 }3 e; u- Y1 ^* t l Indirect speech acts are made for politeness, not vice versa. To make appropriate choices does not necessarily mean indirect speech acts.
: X$ d1 g- j6 s, q3 | l Cooperation and implicature$ X" z+ A: p! d" [) r+ ~. B
n Conversational Implicature1 u2 W% g/ p0 k6 k R" [
u In our daily life, speakers and listeners involved in conversation are generally cooperating with each other. In other words, when people are talking with each other, they must try to converse smoothly and successfully. In accepting speakers’ presuppositions, listeners have to assume that a speaker is not trying to mislead them. This sense of cooperation is simply one in which people having a conversation are not normally assumed to be trying to confuse, trick, or withhold relevant information from one another.
" g: h! S% p& q) L! S z% | u However, in real communication, the intention of the speaker is often not the literal meaning of what he or she says. The real intention implied in the words is called conversational implicature. For example:, {0 m+ i, ]5 H2 S
[1] A: Can you tell me the time?; N: I, b: {2 {0 w
B: Well, the milkman has come.
7 B8 V! i- e( ^9 M j' |8 U u In this little conversation, A is asking B about the time, but B is not answering directly. That indicates that B may also not no the accurate time, but through saying “the milkman has come”, he is in fact giving a rough time. The answer B gives is related to the literal meaning of the words, but is not merely that. That is often the case in communication. The theory of conversational implicature is for the purpose of explaining how listeners infer the speakers’ intention through the words.
3 \- ]2 b# a- Y u The study of conversational implicature starts from Grice (1967), the American philosopher. He thinks, in daily communication, people are observing a set of basic rules of cooperating with each other so as to communicate effectively through conversation. He calls this set of rules the cooperative principle (CP) elaborated in four sub-principles (maxims), that is the cooperative principle.
# G7 w9 k: t7 h/ t n The Cooperative Principle' q4 i" Q9 }( t& P! s
u Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged. The maxims are: |